Police officer recovers damages against intoxicated driver

Background

Police officers and other “occupational rescuers” are exposed to significant trauma during their employment, which can cause psychiatric injury. Often a claim for damages is brought against the rescuer’s employer. However, in AAI Limited v Caffrey [2019] QCA 293, the Queensland Court of Appeal was called upon to consider whether the established duty to take reasonable care not to cause psychiatric injury to a rescuer, extends to occupational rescuers such as police officers. 

On 17 February 2013, Senior Constable David Caffrey (the Respondent) attended a car accident involving a man named Williams; who had crashed his motor vehicle into a tree while travelling at an excessive speed and intoxicated with methamphetamines, amphetamines and marijuana.

The Respondent saw Williams in a state of significant distress, with his legs “squashed” in the frame of the vehicle. He counselled Williams and attempted to calm him down and reassured Williams’ parents when they arrived at the scene.

After Williams was cut out of the wrecked car, paramedics informed the Respondent that Williams was going to die. The Respondent had to break this news to Williams’ parents and then took Williams’ mother by the hand to say goodbye to her son. Williams died soon after.

Performance of these duties had a significant effect on the Respondent. He began to drink alcohol to excess, show continual undue anger and irritation, and experience sustained suicidal ideation.

Trial decision

At trial, the Respondent argued that Williams had owed a duty to take reasonable care not to cause psychiatric injury to any person who, acting in the course of their duties as a police officer, may be required to respond to an accident caused by his driving and who may witness the pain, suffering and/or death of persons at the scene of a car accident.
Williams’ negligence was not in dispute given the excessive speed at which he was travelling and his extreme level of intoxication. The significant issue at trial was whether Williams in fact owed the Respondent, as an occupational rescuer, a duty of care. Justice Flanagan in the Queensland Supreme Court concluded that the Respondent’s psychiatric response to the incident was reasonably foreseeable and that Williams did owe the duty of care alleged. In so finding, Justice Flanagan quoted FAI General Insurance Co Ltd v Lucre [2000] NSWCA 346; “One does not need to be a psychiatrist to understand the reality of the Respondent's reaction”.

His Honour assessed damages in the amount of $1,092,947.88.

Grounds of appeal

AAI Limited (AAI) (Williams’ compulsory third party insurer) submitted two grounds of appeal. The more significant ground was that the trial judge erred in finding that a duty is owed to take reasonable care not to cause psychiatric harm to a person who, in the course of his/her occupation, is required to attend on seriously injured or deceased persons. AAI argued on public policy grounds that rescuers engaged in the occupation of rescuing, as distinct from lay rescuers, ought to be excluded from the established duty of care on the basis that their inclusion in that established duty of care would create an “indeterminate class of prospective plaintiffs which would include police officers, firefighters, paramedics, doctors and nurses, as well as some non-medical staff at a hospital”. In essence, AAI argued that the inclusion of occupational rescuers in the established duty of care would open the floodgates to such claims. 

QCA’s decision

Sofronoff P, Philippides and McMurdo JJA sitting in the Queensland Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal with costs. Their Honours unanimously upheld the trial decision.
Sofronoff delivered the lead judgment, making the following key points regarding the duty of care issue:

  1. The key authorities in this area of the law clearly establish that, provided the usual principals that govern the rights of rescuers to recover damages for injuries are satisfied, the mere fact that a rescuer happens to be a police officer does not act as a legal bar to liability.
  2. It is outside the function of an intermediate court of appeal to determine issues of policy of the common law of tort liability, in circumstances where there is clear direction from the relevant case law as to the appropriate outcome.

This decision confirms that a duty of care is owed to rescuers regardless of their occupation. However, as many occupational rescuers will have difficulty establishing that their psychiatric injury was caused by exposure to a single traumatic event, it is unlikely there will be a flood of similar claims.